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Abstract—This paper presents a practical solution to the prob-
lem of limited bandwidth in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)-
secured communication through using rapidly rekeyed Internet
Protocol security (IPsec) links. QKD is a cutting-edge security
technology that provides mathematically proven security by using
quantum physical effects and information theoretical axioms to
generate a guaranteed non-disclosed stream of encryption keys.
Although it has been a field of theoretical research for some time,
it has only been producing market-ready solutions for a short
period of time. The downside of this technology is that its key
generation rate is only around 52,000 key bits per second over a
distance of 50 km. As this rate limits the data throughput to the
same rate, it is substandard for normal modern communications,
especially for securely interconnecting networks. IPsec, on the
other hand, is a well-known security protocol that uses classical
encryption and is capable of exactly creating site-to-site virtual
private networks. This paper presents a solution that combines
the performance advantages of IPsec with QKD. The combination
sacrifices only a small portion of QKD security by using the
generated keys a limited number of times instead of just once.
As a part of this, the solution answers the question of how many
data bits per key bit make sensible upper and lower boundaries
to yield high performance while maintaining high security. While
previous approaches complement the Internet Key Exchange
protocol (IKE), this approach simplifies the implementation with
a new key synchronization concept, proposing a lightweight
protocol that uses relatively few, slim control messages and
sparse acknowledgement. Furthermore, it provides a Linux-based
module for the AIT QKD software using the Netlink XFRM
Application Programmers Interface to feed the quantum key to
the IPsec cipher. This enables wire-speed, QKD-secured commu-
nication links for business applications. This paper, apart from
the description of the solution itself, describes the surrounding
software environment, including the key exchange, and illustrates
the results of thorough test simulations with a variety of different
protocol parameter settings.
Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution; QKD; IPsec; Cryp-
tography; Security; Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
A recent paper presents an approach to combine quantum
key distribution (QKD) with IPsec by using QKD to provide
IPsec with the cryptographic keys necessary for its operation
[1]. This article extends the work described in the mentioned
paper such that it further examines the impact of noise (and
other effects that are likely to happen in real-world networks)
on the presented solution. Quantum cryptography, in this
particular case quantum key distribution, has the purpose to
ensure the confidentiality of a communication channel between
two parties. The major difference to classical cryptography is
that it does not rely on assumptions about the security of the
mathematical problem it is based on, nor the computing power
of a hypothetical attacker. Instead, QKD presents a secure
method of exchanging keys by connecting the two communi-
cating parties with a quantum channel and thereby supplying
them with guaranteed secret and true random key material [2,
p.743]. When the key is applied through a Vernam cipher (also
called one time pad - OTP) on a data channel on any public
network, this method provides the channel with information-
theoretically (in other words mathematically proven) security
[3, p.583]. An information-theoretically secure1 system means,
besides a mathematical proof, that this system is still secure
if an attacker has infinite resources and time at his disposal
to cryptographically analyze it [4, pp.659]. The downside of
combining QKD with OTP is the limitation to approximately
fifty-two kilobits over fifty kilometers, shown in a practical
QKD setup [5, p.1], due to physical and technical factors,
since in OTP one key bit is consumed by one data bit [6, S.9].
OTP is so far the only known information-theoretically (also
called unconditionally) secure encryption algorithm [7, pp.177
- 178]. The offered data rate, however, does not meet the
requirements of modern communications. Another practical
approach came to the same conclusion and therefore uses the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) instead of OTP [8, p.6].
As IPsec is a widespread security protocol suite that provides
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality for data connections,
this approach uses the combination of IPsec and QKD to
overcome this restrictions [9, p.4].
To save valuable key material, this solution uses it for
more than one data packet in IPsec, thus increasing the
effective data rate, which is thereby not limited to the key
1Shannon used the term secrecy instead of security. In cryptography, more
secrecy means more security [2, p.1]. Thus, the two terms are synonymous
in this context.
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rate anymore. Furthermore, using this approach, the presented
solution benefits from the flexibility of IPsec in terms of
cryptographic algorithms and cipher modes. In contrast to most
of the previous approaches (see Section II), that supplemented
the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol or combine in some
way quantum-derived and classical keys, this paper refrains
from using IKE (for a key exchange is rather the objective of
QKD, as described later) in favor of a specialized, lightweight
key synchronization protocol, working with a master/slave
architecture. The goal of this protocol is to achieve very
high changing rates of purely quantum-derived keys on the
communicating peers while maintaining the keys synchronous
in a very resilient manner, which means to deal with subopti-
mal networking conditions including packet losses and late
or supplicate packets. In order to fulfill this objective, the
following questions need to be clarified:
• What is the minimum acceptable frequency of changing
the IPsec key that will ensure sufficient security?
• What is the maximum acceptable frequency of changing
the IPsec key to save QKD key material?
• Is the native Linux kernel implementation suitable for this
task?
• How can key synchronicity between the communication
peers be assured at key periods of 50 milliseconds and
less?
As a proof of concept, this paper further presents a software
solution, called QKDIPsec, implementing this approach in
C++. This software is intended to be used as an IPsec mod-
ule for the multi platform hardware-independent AIT QKD
software, which provides already a market-ready solution for
OTP-based QKD. The module achieves over forty key changes
per second for the IPsec subsystem within the Linux kernel.
At present time, the software uses a static key ring buffer
for testing purposes instead of actual QKD keys, for the
integration of QKDIPsec into the AIT QKD software is yet
to be implemented (although most of the necessary interfaces
are already present). The ultimate goal is to deliver a fully
operational IPsec module for the AIT QKD software.
The following Section II of this paper describes previous ap-
proaches on combining IPsec and QKD. Section III describes
considerations regarding necessary and sensible key change
rates, exhibiting the reflections that lead to the assumed re-
quirements of a quantum key synchronization solution. Section
IV contains the architecture of the presented solution and the
subsequent Section V its implementation, while Section VI
describes its incorporation into the AIT QKD software. De-
scriptions of the setups and results of laboratory Experiments,
showing the practical capabilities of this proof of concept,
form the Sections VII through VIII. Section IX, eventually,
contains the conclusions drawn.
II. RELATED WORK
This work is aware of some previously developed methods
to combine QKD with IPsec. All of them work in conjunction
with the IKE [10, pp.234-235][11, p.177-182][12][13, pp.5-
9][14, p.21] or the underlying ISAKMP [15, pp.6-8] protocol.
They introduce a supplement for QKD parameters or combine
IKE-derived and QKD-derived keys. Opposed to this, the
presented work tries to use an approach omitting IKE and
following the pivotal idea that there is no need for that protocol
to exchange keys, for that is the task of QKD. The key
feed from QKD therefore provides the material for manual
keying in this solution, all that is left is to keep those keys
synchronous. For this task, this paper proposes a more slender
approach (see Section IV). Furthermore, some of the previous
approaches operate at a substantially lower speed than the
key change presented in this thesis or use OTP limiting the
data rate to the QKD key rate (currently around 52 kilobits
per second) or simply suggest applying QKD keys to IPsec
without a mechanism for changing keys rapidly, effectively
not lowering the number of data bits per key bit.
III. KEY CHANGE RATE CONSIDERATIONS
The strength of every cryptographic system relies on the
key strength, the secrecy of the key and the effectiveness of
the used algorithms [16, p.5]. As this solution relies on QKD,
which generates a secret and true random key [17], this means
that more effective algorithms and more key material are
able to provide more cryptographic security. In this particular
case, the used algorithms are already prescribed by the IPsec
standard [18]. Therefore, the security is mainly determined by
the used key lengths, more precisely by the relation between
the amount of key material and the amount of data, which
should be as much in favor of the key material as possible -
given the low key rate compared to the data rate, naturally the
opposite is the case in practice. This section aims on giving
feasible upper and lower boundaries of key change rates (or
key periods Pk, respectively) and, thus, how much QKD key
material should be used in order to save precious quantum key
material while maintaining a very high level of security. The
two main factors determining the key period in practice are the
used algorithms (via their respective key lengths - the longer
the key, the more key bits are used in one key period) and the
capabilities of QKD in generating keys. The QKD solution of
the Austrain Institute of Technology has proven to provide a
quantum key rate Q of up to 12,500 key bits per second at
close distances, 3,300 key bits at around 25 kilometers and
550 key bits at around 50 kilometers distance [6, p.9]. As this
paper presents a practical implementation (see Section V) in
the form of a module for the AIT QKD software, the highest
of these values should be the reference key bandwidth for the
key length and period considerations made in this section.
In order to fully utilize the possible QKD key rate and given
the currently shortest recommended key length, which is 128
bits (see below), an IPsec solution using quantum-derived keys
should be able to perform around 100 key changes per second
( 12,500128 ≈ 97, 65), 50 for every communication direction (for
IPsec connection channels are in principle unidirectional and
therefore independent from each other even if they belong to
the same bidirectional conversation). This corresponds to a
key period Pk of around 20 ms, as it is a function of the
Quantum key rate Q and the algorithm’s key length k. The
period for a bidirectional IPsec link is PK = ( Q2k )
−1. At longer
key lengths, this period becomes longer, for a single change
cycle uses more key material and, thus, less key changes are
necessary to utilize the full incoming key stream, therefore
this period Pkmin = 20ms presents a feasible lower boundary
for the key period. As stated above, the security of this system
depends also on the data rate. Given a widespread data rate
of 100 megabits per second, a key period of 20 ms and 128
key bits means a ratio of 8000 data bits per key bit (or short
dpk, for the reader’s convenience).
A landmark in this security ratio is 1 dpk, as this rate
would provide unconditional security when applied with OTP.
For the cipher and hash suites included in the IPsec protocol
stack, there is no security proof and therefore they are not
unconditionally secure. However, applying an IPsec cipher
(for instance AES) with an appropriately fast key change and
restricted data rate to achieve 1 dpk is the closest match inside
standard IPsec, especially when the block size equals the key
size.
To define an upper boundary (and therefore a minimum
standard for the high security application of the presented
solution), a very unfavorable relation between data and key
bits through a high-speed connection of 10 gigabits of data is
assumed. A recent attack on AES-192/256 uses 269.2 computa-
tions with 232 chosen plaintext [19, p.1]. Because of the AES
block size of 128 bits, this corresponds to 232 ∗ 27 = 239
data bits. Although this attack is currently not feasible in
practice, as it works only for seven out of 12/14 rounds and
also has unfeasible requirements to data storage on processing
power for a cryptanalytic machine, it serves as a theoretical
fundament for this upper boundary. A bandwidth of 10 gigabits
per second equals approximately 9.3 gibibits per second. This
is by the factor of 64 (26) smaller than the amount of data for
the attack mentioned above, which means that it requires 64
seconds to gather the necessary amount of data to (though only
theoretically) conduct the attack. In conclusion (with AES-
192/256), the key should be changed at least every minute
(Pkmax = 60s), while the maximum allowed key period
according to the IPsec standard lies at eight hours or 28,800
seconds [20].
For cryptographic algorithms operating with lower cipher
block sizes (ω), the birthday bound (2
ω
2 ) is relevant. The
birthday bound describes the number of brute force attempts
to enforce a collision with a probability of 50 percent, such
that different clear text messages render to the same cipher
text [21]. With a block size of 64 (birthday bound = 232),
the example speed of 10 gigabit per second above would
lower the secure key period to under half a second. Because
of this factor, using 64-bit ciphers is generally discouraged
for the use with modern data rates[22, pp.1-3] (although the
present rapid rekeying approach is able to cope with this
problem). Regarding key lengths, 128 bits are recommended
beyond 2031 [16, p.56] while key sizes of 256 bits provide
good protection even against the use of Grover’s algorithm in
hypothetical quantum computers for this period [23, p.32].
IV. RAPID REKEYING PROTOCOL
This section describes the rapid rekeying protocol, the
purpose of which is to provide to IPsec peers with QKD-
derived key material and keep these keys synchronous under
the low-key-period conditions (down to Pkmin = 20ms) stated
in Section III.
This protocol pursues the approach that with QKD, there
is no need for a classical key exchange (for instance with
IKE). Relevant connection parameters (like peer addresses)
are available a priori (before the establishment of the connec-
tion) in point-to-point connections, whereas keying material
is provided by QKD, mostly obsoleting IKE. Furthermore,
IPsec only dictates an automatic key exchange, not specifically
IKE [9, p.48] and a protocol that only synchronizes QKD-
derived keys (instead of exchanging keys) is therefore deemed
sufficient, yet compliant to the IPsec standard. Consequently,
it is an outspoken objective to create a slender and simple key
synchronization protocol to increase performance and reduce
possible sources of error. Another objective for key synchro-
nization is robustness in terms of resilience against suboptimal
network environment conditions. The protocol described in
this paper uses two channels for encrypted communication:
an Authenticaton Header (AH)-authenticated control channel
(amongst other tasks, signaling for key changes) and an
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)-encrypted data channel
to transmit the protected data (see Figure 1). The reason for
the use of AH on the control channel is that it only contains
non-secret information, while its authenticity is crucial for the
security and stability of the protocol. The necessary security
policies (SPs) for the IPsec channels remain constant during
the connection. There are four necessary SPs, one data and one
control SP for each direction. The complete software solution
will, delivered by the AIT QKD software, contain additionally
the quantum channel for key exchange and a Q3P channel
(see Section VI), whereby the latter is another protocol that
provides OTP-encrypted QKD point-to-point links.
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Fig. 1. Rapid Rekeying Channel Architecture
The protocol itself follows, taking account of the unidirec-
tional architecture of IPsec, a master/slave paradigm. Every
peer assumes the master role for the connection in which
the peer represents the sending part. When a key change
is due (for instance because of the expiration of the key
period), the master sends an according message (key change
request) to the slave and the latter changes the key (as does
the master). To compensate lost key change signals, every
key change message contains the security parameters index
(SPI) for the next-to-use key. The SPI is simply calculable
for the peers through a salted hash whereby the salt and a
initial seed value are QKD-derived and each SPI is a hash of
its predecessor plus salt, which makes it non-obvious to third
parties. This level of security is sufficient, for the SPI is a
public value, included non-encrypted in every corresponding
IPsec packet, making it a subject rather to non-predictability
than to secrecy. Also, using only a seed and salt from QKD,
the hashing method safes quantum keying material. As all
necessary IPsec parameters are available beforehand, as well
as the keys (through QKD), IPsec security associations (SAs)
may be pre-calculated and established in advance (which are
identified by unique SPIs). Permanently changing attributes
during a conversation are only the SPI and the key, while
all other parameters of an SA (for instance peer addresses,
services, protocols) remain constant. The master calculates
these two in advance and queues them for future use. Only one
SA is actually installed (aplied to the kernel IPsec subsystem),
for only one (per default, at least in Linux, the most recent)
may be used to encrypt data. The slave, on the other hand,
operates differently. For it identifies the right key to use based
on the SPI, it may very well have multiple matching SAs
installed. This makes key queuing expendable on the receiver
side, while the SPI queuing is used as an indexer for lost key
change message detection. For reasons of data packets arriving
out of synchronization, SAs are not only installed beforehand,
but also left in the system for some time on the receiver side,
allowing it to process packets encrypted with both an older or
newer key than the current one.
On every key change event, the master applies a new SA to
the system (using the next following SPI/key from the queues),
prepares a new SPI/key pair (SPI generation as mentioned
above and acquirement of a new key from the QKD system)
and deletes the deprecated data from both its queues and the
IPsec subsystem. The slave also acquires a new SPI/key pair
(the same the sender acquires) but installs it directly as an SA
and only stores the SPI for indexing. It subsequently deletes
the oldest SA from the system and SPI from the queue if the
number of installed SAs exceeds a configured limit. To sum
it up, on every key change event, the two peers conduct the
following steps:
• the master acquires a new key and SPI and ads it to its
queues
• it sends a key change request to the slave
• it fetches the oldest pair from the queue an installs it as
a new SA, replacing the current one
• it deletes the deprecated pair from its queue
• the slave receives the key change request and also ac-
quires a new SPI/key pair (the same as the master)
• it installs the pair as a new SA and the SPI into the
indexing queue
• it deletes the oldest SA from the system and oldest SPI
from the queue
• it sends a key change acknowledgement
This procedure keeps both of the installed SA types up to
date. For instance, 50 installed SAs for the slave resulting in
25 queued SPI/key pairs on the master, for the latter does not
need to store backward SAs. At the beginning, on every key
change, SPI/key pair is acquired, while the already applied
remain. When the (configurable) working threshold is met,
additionally the oldest SA or SPI/key pair is deleted, keeping
the queue sizes and number of installed SAs constant.
Figure 2 illustrates this process for a sender (Alice) and a
receiver (Bob), where the arrows show the changes in case of
an induced key change. Naturally, as with SPs, there are four
SA types on a peer: one for data and control channels, each for
sending (master) and receiving (slave). Each SA corresponds
to an SPI and key queue on the master’s side and one SPI
queue on the slave’s side, respectively.
SPI=7
SPI=6
SPI=5
SPI=4
KEY=g
KEY=f
KEY=e
KEY=d SA=4/d SA=4/d
SA=3/c
SA=2/b
SA=5/e
SA=6/f
SA=7/g
SPI=4
SPI=3
SPI=2
SPI=5
SPI=6
SPI=7
Inbound SAs Inbound QueueOutbound SAsOutbound QueueKey Queue
Alice Bob
next SA=8
next key=h
next SA=5 next SA=8
delete SA=2
delete SA=4
delete key=d
new current=5
SA in queue installed SA current element key in queue
Fig. 2. Key Change Process
As the data stream is independent from control signaling,
this calculation in advance prevents the destabilization of the
key synchronization in case of lost and too early or too late
arriving key change messages. The buffer of previously created
SAs compensates desynchronization. For every receiver is
able to calculate the according SPIs beforehand, it may, by
comparing a received SPI with an expected, detect and correct
the discrepancy by calculating the following SAs. Through this
compensation process, there is neither need to interfere with
the data communication nor to even inform the sender of lost
key change messages; the sender may unperturbedly continue
with data and control communications. This mechanisms make
constant acknowledgements expendable and contribute thereby
to a better protocol performance through omission of the
round trip times for the majority of the necessary control
messages. Because of this, acknowledgement messages (key
change acknowledge) are still sent, but serve merely as a
keepalive mechanism instead of true acknowledgements (see
Figure 3).
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Fig. 3. Key Change Message Flow
In rare occasions, a key change message might be actually
received, but the slave might not be able to apply the key for
some reason (for instance issues regarding the QKD system
or the Kernel). In this case, it reports the failure to the master
with an appropriate message (key change fail). In case too
many control packets go missing (what the receiver is able
to detect by SPI comparisons and the sender by the absence
of keepalive packets) or the key application fails, every peer
is able to initiate a reset procedure (master or slave reset).
The actual threshold of allowed and compensated missing
messages is a matter of configuration and corresponds to the
queue sizes for the SAs and therefore the ability of the system
to compensate these losses. The master does not need to report
key change fails, for it is in control of the synchronization
process and might just initiate a reset if it is unable to apply
its key. An additional occasion for a reset is the beginning
of a conversation. At that point, the master starts the key
synchronization process with an initial reset. A reset consists
of clearing and refilling all of the queues and installed SAs.
For the same reason as for the data channel, the authentication
key for the control channel changes periodically. Due to the
relatively low transmission rates on the control channel the
key period is much longer (the software’s default is 3 seconds)
than on the data channel. As, therefore, control channel key
changes are comparatively rare and reset procedures should
only occur in extreme situations, both types implement a three
way handshake. This is, on the one hand, because of the low
impact on the overall performance due to the rare occurrences,
on the other hand due to higher impact of faulty packets. The
control channel, however, implements the same SA buffering
method as the data channel (only with AH SAs, for the reasons
stated at the beginning of this section).
V. IMPLEMENTATION
The presented solution, called QKDIPsec, consists of three
parts (see also Figure 4):
• key acquisition;
• key application;
• key synchronization;
QKD IPsec
Kernel IPsec Stack
AIT QKDUser
Network Interface
Control, Keys
SPs, SAs, Keys
Params, Key Sync
Data
Encrypt Data
Fig. 4. QKDIPsec Systems Context
Each of this tasks has a corresponding submodule inside
QKDIPsec, while the overall control lies within the responsi-
bility of the ConnectionManager class, which provides the
main outside interface and instantiates the classes of said
submodules using corresponding configuration. Also, all of
these classes have corresponding configuration classes using a
factory method pattern [24, p.134] and according configuration
classes, decoupling program data and logic. The first task (key
acquisition) is the objective of an interface to the AIT QKD
software, the KeyManager, which provides the quantum key
material. In this proof of concept, this class generates dummy
key from a ring buffer, while it already has the according
interfaces for the QKD software to serve as a class to acquire
quantum key material and provide it in an appropriate way
to QKDIPsec. By now, only one function implementation is
missing on the QKD software side to fully integrate QKDIPsec
into the QKD software.
The second part (KernelIPsecManager) enters the acquired
key directly into the Linux kernel, which encrypts the data
sent to and decrypts the data received from a peer. Responsible
for this part are a number of C++ classes, which control the
SP and SA databases (SPD and SAD) within the Kernel’s
IPsec subsystem via the Linux Netlink protocol. Therefore,
this solution uses the derived class NetlinkIPsecManager, but
leaves the option to use other methods for kernel access as
well. The reason for using Netlink to communicate with the
kernel is that it was found the most intuitive of the available
methods and that it is also able to handle not only the
IPsec subsystem but a broad span of network functions in
Linux. Furthermore, using a direct kernel API, as opposed
to other IPsec implementations, omits middleware, both en-
hancing performance as well as eliminating potential source
of error. Also using Netlink functions, this part governs the
tunnel interfaces and routing table entries necessary for the
communication via the classes KernelNetworkManager and
NetlinkNetworkManager as well.
Netlink is a socket-oriented protocol and allows therefore
the use of well-known functions from network program-
ming. The difference to the latter is that instead of network
peers, communication runs within the system as inter-process
communication (IPC), through which also the kernel (via
process ID zero) is addressable. Due to its network-oriented
nature, a packet structure is used instead of function calls
via parameters. This means that commands to the kernel (for
instance to add a new SA) needs to be memory-aligned in
the according packet structure and subsequently send to the
kernel via a Netlink socket. A downside of Netlink during
implementation was the complicated nature and weak docu-
mentation of its IPsec manipulation part (NETLINK XFRM).
While the Netlink protocol itself is present in every message in
the form of its uniform header, the NETLINK XFRM parts use
a different structure plus individual extra payload attributes for
every type of message (add and delete messages for both SAs
and SPs), making the according class hierarchy rather inflated.
Also, the solution uses the NETLINK ROUTE protocol to add
and delete both IP interface addresses and network routes.
To take this into account, the QKDIPsec implementation
uses a set of Netlink message classes, deriving from the
common base class NetlinkMessage. This class contains the
common Netlink header. Each message type for IPsec and
network function configuration is further a child class, con-
taining the exact data fields necessary for Netlink. Due to
the separation of code and data segments in C++, the class
functions do not interfere with the netlink data fields and
therefore its alignment [25, pp.142-143]. This means that the
class hierarchy takes care of the memory alignment necessary
for the Netlink protocol. As stated above, the structure for
NETLINK XFRM messages is rather heterogenous, basically
requiring every message type to be assembled directly in
the class, except for the Netlink header. The messages of
the NETLINK ROUTE protocol, on the other hand, are more
structured, allowing it to introduce intermediate classes for
routing table and interface addresses messages.
The key synchronization, eventually, is the main task of
the Rapid Rekeying Protocol. As this is the very core of
the solution, its implementation resides directly inside the
connection manager. While it uses the classes mentioned
above to acquire and apply the QKD keys in the manner
discussed in Section IV, it handles the key synchronization
using sender and receiver threads (representing the master
and slave parts, respectively), as well as a class for key
synchronization messages. Within this class, also the described
lost message compensation and reset, as well as initialization
and clean-up procedures are implemented. The reset procedure
may also include some re-initialization process for the QKD
system, triggered via the KeyManager. This class also sets the
clocking for the key changes, which is dynamically adjustable
during runtime.
VI. INTEGRATION
QKDIPsec has been integrated into the current AIT QKD
R10 Software Suite V9.9999.7[26]. This Open Source soft-
ware contains a full featured QKD post processing envi-
ronment containing BB84 sifting, error correction, privacy
amplification and other steps necessary. The final stage of
an AIT QKD post processing pipeline is a QKD key store,
realized as Q3P link.
The central task of Q3P is to keep the key material derived
from quantum key distribution in synchronization on both
ends of a point-to-point link. It does this by managing several
buffers as depicted in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Q3P Key Store Model
• A Pickup Store: Before a key can be used, Q3P has to
verify, that a particular key is present on the other side of
the connection. Reasons a key may not be present at the
same point of time in a peer’s key store are found in the
highly asynchrony and distributed manner key material is
inserted on both machines. Therefore, those key blocks
are treated as a collection of potentially usable keys and
are stored in a Pickup Store directly related to a certain
QKD post processing pipeline. Hence, a single Q3P link
can maintain multiple concurrent QKD post processing
lines to boost throughput. Also Q3P does not know if a
concrete QKD hardware device is pushing keys into the
Pickup Store or an application, which might have derived
shared secret keys by other means of deployment.
• A Common Store: Once the presence of the key material
has been verified on both sides the key is transfered to the
Common Store on disk. This is the only persistent data
storage of key material within Q3P. However, keys placed
in the Common Store are not bound to any dedicated
usage.
• An Outgoing Buffer: Once key material is present in the
Common Store, Q3P moves chunks of key material to
an Outgoing Buffer. Keys residing in this buffer are used
to establish an information- theoretically secure channel
for encryption and authentication for outgoing messages.
Note that, due to the nature of information-theoretically
secure ciphers (such as the Vernam cipher), encryption
combined with authentication key consumption for single
messages is at a minimum as large as the length of the
message sent [27, p.15]. Also, keys that are used for
messaging are removed from the buffer and destroyed.
• An Incoming Buffer: For incoming messages each Q3P
endpoint mirrors the Outgoing Buffer of its peer as its
local Incoming Buffer. The keys for authenticity checks
of received messages as well as for decryption are picked
from this buffer.
• An Application Buffer: On behalf the Incoming and the
Outgoing Buffers Q3P established yet a third Buffer:
the Application Buffer. Key material moved from the
Common Store to this buffer in memory is dedicated for
use by any application utilizing Q3P.
The rationale for having separate buffers for outgoing mes-
sages and one for incoming is based on potential race con-
ditions when doing heavy communication in both directions.
Suppose both Q3P nodes do heavy interaction in streaming
messages in both directions, then without such separation the
situation, in which both key stores utilize the very same key
for different messages is most likely. Q3P also introduces a
master/slave role model on key dedication: one partner in
the communication acts as master, which is responsible for
assigning key material from the Common Store to one of
the three buffers. The slave on the other side requests such
assignments on demand.
The filling of the Outgoing and Incoming Buffers take
precedence before the Application Buffer. Only if both buffers
used for direct information theoretic communication do share
a minimum threshold of key material the Application buffer
is filled with keys from the Common Store.
The proposed protocol uses the established information
theoretic secured channel provided by Q3P by means of the
Outgoing and Incoming Buffer inside Rapid Rekeying. Key
material from the Application Buffer is used to create the
protocols SPI and SAs. As key material is directed to the
Outgoing and Incoming Buffers first, this results in “slow
start” of an IPSec enabled connection.
Although the protocol runs inside the process space of a
single Q3P instance, from a software engineering point of view
the protocol’s key withdrawal of the Application Buffer bears
no difference to any other application using the same buffer.
VII. THROUGHPUT EXPERIMENTS
The protocol design of the described solution aims on
the one hand on speed and flexibility and on the other
hand on fault tolerance, hence the architecture is as simple
and lightweight as possible (including abandoning the IKE
protocol). Due to this, very high IPsec key change rates can
be achieved, even under harsh conditions. The solution was
implemented in software using C++ and tested on two to
five year-old Linux computers (Alice and Bob), both in a
gigabit Local Area Network (LAN) and a UMTS-Wide Area
Network (WAN) environment (the latter further aggravated
by combining it with WLAN and an additional TLS-based
VPN tunnel - see Figure 6) by means of data transfer time
measurement and ping tests, as well as validation of the actual
key changes by a Wireshark network sniffer (Eve).
TLS/SSL VPN Tunnel
Switch
1Gb
1 Gb
Alice
Bob
Eve
1Gb
WAN
WAN
WLAN
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Firewall
Internet
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Fig. 6. WAN Test Setup
Table I shows the results in seconds (four trials each,
separated by slashes) of data transmission and in percent on
ping tests within the mentioned LAN and WAN environments
with various configurations: unencrypted, standard IPsec and
QKDIPsec with different encryption algorithms, the latter also
with different key periods. In these tests, both data transfer
and ping were initiated by one peer (Alice). While the ping
test was continuous, the data transfer consisted each of one
data transfer from Alice to Bob and vice versa. The test file
used on the LAN was a video file of 69.533.696 bytes size,
while the WAN file was also a video, but only 1.813.904 bytes
big. In both cases, key periods of 25 ms and less could be
achieved, maintaining a stable data connection. This, using
the recommended key length of 256 bit, surpasses the goal of
12,500 key bits per second (the currently maximal quantum
key distribution rate under ideal circumstances), even though
(deliberately) legacy equipment and a less-than-ideal network
environment was used. Comparison of the performance shows
a (expectable) higher data transfer period of QKDIPsec and
unencrypted traffic, but no significant difference to traditional
IPsec. Only the packet losses on a simultaneously running ping
test were a few percentage points higher (mainly in the WAN
environment).
TABLE I. PERFORMANCE TEST RESULTS
LAN
Setting A→B B→A Ping
unencrypted 6/6/7/6 7/9/7/8 100%
AES-256 CCM
standard IPsec 14/14/16/15 17/18/26/18 100%
50 ms 8/10/8/9 14/16/16/16 100%
25 ms 10/9/8/8 14/15/17/16 100%
20 ms 9/9/9/9 11/16/17/12 100%
AES-256 CBC
20 ms 9/7/7 11/13/17 100%
Blowfish-448
20 ms 14/9/7 15/13/14 99%
WAN
Setting A→B B→A Ping
unencrypted 10/10/10/10 9/7/6/7 99%
AES-256 CCM
standard IPsec 11/11/11/11 11/5/6/5 99%
50 ms 14/10/11/13 6/5/5/5 95%
25 ms 10/11/10/10 6/7/6/7 94%
20 ms 12/11/13/10 9/5/6/6 98%
AES-256 CBC
20 ms 10/11/11 9/7/8 100%
To verify the key changes, a network sniffer, Eve, was
keeping track of the actual SPI changes of the packets trans-
mitted between Alice and Bob. Table II shows a random
sample of key change periods in milliseconds during the
above mentioned LAN 20ms AES-256-CCM test. Within this
table, the first column shows the key change times for data
(ESP) packets from Alice to Bob while the second shows
the opposite direction. As the recorded data contains one file
copy from Alice to Bob (in the first half of the record) and
one vice versa (in the second half), one randomly chosen
sample of five consecutive key changes for each direction
and from each half is chosen. This form of sample choosing
from different phases and directions of the communication
session and averaging them compensates inaccuracies, induced
by the pause between key change and respective next following
packet, which become greater the less traffic is sent. As
the receiver only acknowledges received data and, therefore,
sends significantly less packets, the vagueness of the non-
averaged results is greater when receiving. The total average
of all four of these averaged values is 0.020495 ms, which is
approximately 2.5% above 20 ms per key change. This may
be explained by the send and receive overhead for processing
the key change messages, for the period determines only the
sleeping duration of a sender thread.
Because of the lower amount of traffic (due to the lower
speed) and higher latency such exact time readings are not
possible in the WAN environment. Therefore, the measurement
method was changed to averaging a sample set of 20 key
change periods, using the same random choosing as above.
With approximately 0.2475, the total averaged result lies
significantly higher (approximately 19%) than the one of the
LAN setting. One possible explanation for this behavior is the
latency in this environment.
TABLE II. Network Sniffing Results
A→B B→A
1st 2nd 1st 2nd
LAN 0.0220 0.0216 0.0208 0.0203
0.0187 0.0204 0.0197 0.0235
0.0145 0.0216 0.0203 0.0176
0.0195 0.0243 0.0204 0.0197
0.0225 0.0180 0.0207 0.0238
Ø 0.0194 0.0212 0.0204 0.0210
WAN
∑
20 0.5201 0.4899 0.4302 0.5397
Ø 0.0260 0.0245 0.0215 0.0270
Additionally, the recovery behavior was tested by letting the
master deliberately omit key change notifications through ma-
nipulating the sending routine, while again running ping tests
and file copies. Omitting single key change messages (and,
thus, testing the recovery mechanism) yield in no measurable
impact on the connection (along with 100% of successful
pings). Also, by the same method of omitting key change
requests, but this time surpassing the recovery queue size,
the reset procedure was tested. The queue size was set to 50
and Alice was programmed to omit 50 sending key change
messages after 200 sent ones. Expectedly, Bob initiated a reset
procedure during the hiatus, resulting in a cycle of 200 key
changes and a subsequent reset. Despite these permanent reset-
induced interruptions, bidirectional ping tests only yielded
insignificant losses (99.74% from Alice to Bob and 99.36%
vice versa). Furthermore, a file copy in both directions was
still possible.
Further, to test the endurance of the solution, one experiment
was conducted to show the capability of maintaining the
connection over a longer period of time. It was performed
with an earlier development version of QKDIPsec and ran
in LAN environment over around 16 hours. It consisted of a
running ping test on a 50 ms Blowfish configuration without
control channel key changes. Of 56179 pings returned 56164
resulting in a return rate of approximately 99.97%. This test
was also conducted in WAN environment, but (due to both
tests ran overnight) an automated network connection reset
after around eight hours prevented meaningful results.
The last test was actively severing the network connection.
Pulling the plug on one side resulted in a connection loss that
was only recoverable by executing the connection setup rou-
tine. This normally does not occur automatically in QKDIPsec
but can be induced by the calling function (ordinarily the
AIT QKD software). The cause for this behavior is that a
shut down (or connectionless) interface loses its additional IP
addresses and therefore the tunnel address for the data channel.
This problem might be circumvented by implementing an own
virtual interface in the future. When servering the connection
along the path (thus leaving the peer interfaces intact) the
solution automatically recovered (loosing only traffic during
the servered phase) when reconnected timely or entered the
reset procedures (reset trial and function suspension on time)
on disruption spanning over more than the timeout period,
according to protocol.
VIII. QKDIPSEC IN A SIMULATION
In order to investigate the impact of the time interval
between key change notifications on the overall performance
and on the underlying data transmission, we implemented
the Rapid Rekeying Protocol in OMNeT++ [28] using the
INET framework. Besides IPSec and the Rapid Rekeying
Protocol we implemented an UDP application that sends a
certain amount of data to its counterpart using IPSec. We
built an evaluation setup with two communicating hosts, and
introduced delay and packet drops to the setup. The Rapid
Rekeying Protocol allows to vary the following variables: num-
ber of (simultaneous) installed SAs, and the interval between
sending a key change request. For now, we assume that the
keys can be provided with an infinite rate, thus idealizing
the generation of the key material. Table III provides the
different parameter settings used for the simulation. For each
combination of the parameters (64 in total) we conducted 30
runs. For the simulation we assumed a sufficiently large QKD
key rate (such that none of the applications has to wait for
new key material). In the following we report the averages of
these runs and their 95% confidence interval (CI) for some
selecting parameter settings.
TABLE III. Parameter Settings for the Simulation.
Parameter Values
Installed SAs 5, 15, 40, 70
Key Change Interval (ms) 25, 50, 100, 200
hline UDP Data Traffic (Mbps) 1, 1.5, 1.7, 1.9
Simulation Time (s) 600
Channel Delay (ms) X ∼ U(5, 25)
Channel Data Rate (Mbps) 2
Packet Drop Probability min(X ∼ U(0, 1) , 0.05)
Figure 7 depicts the average of deciphered packets with
95% CIs for a maximum of 5 installed SAs at the receiving
client. With an increase in the re-keying interval the receiver
is able to decipher approximately 80% of all data packets.
This is valid for the tested data rates. Although, reaching
the theoretical channel data rate of 2 Mbps decreases the
number of deciphered packets due to the fact that packets
are dropped by full queues. Figure 8 depicts the average of
out of synchronization packet with 95% CIs relative to the
total amount of received packets using the same parameter
settings as for Figure 7. It is evident that with a lower re-
keying intervals the amount of non-decipherable and out of
synchronization packets increases. However, selecting larger
re-keying intervals increases the probability that a man in
the middle attacks will be successful. Therefore, a tradeoff
between data rate and the desired security level has to be
found. Although, we have to consider that some packets are
dropped because of the chosen packet drop probability (cf.
Table III).
Fig. 7. Packets deciphered relative to the total amount of sent packets for
the given data rates with a maximum number of 5 installed SAs for
different re-keying intervals, respectively.
Fig. 8. Packets out of synchronization relative to the total amount of
received packets for the given data rates with a maximum number of 5
installed SAs for different re-keying intervals, respectively.
Figures 9 and 10 depict the relative amount of deciphered
and out of synchronization packets for a data rate of with 95%
CIs for a data rate of 1.5 Mbps. Increasing the the number of
simultaneous installed SAs, the probability of encountering
out of synchronization packets decreases. Nonetheless, one
observes the same behavior as for Figures 7 and 8. Assuming
a re-keying interval of 100 ms, a data rate of 1.5 Mbps and a
maximum of 15 installed SAs, using QKDIPsec we are able to
achieve an effective data rate of approx. 1.1 Mbps on average.
If a re-keying interval of 200 ms is acceptable, we are able
to achieve an effective data rate of approximately 1.35 Mbps
on average. However, it remains the ultimate goal to derive
a model by means of ε-security, which provides a trade-off
between security and the effective data rate. We devote this to
future work.
Fig. 9. Packets deciphered relative to the total amount of sent packets for a
data rate of 1.5 Mbps.
Fig. 10. Packets out of synchronization relative to the total amount of
received packets for a data rate of 1.5 Mbps.
IX. CONCLUSION
These proof of concept tests show that using IPsec with
appropriate key management is able to overcome the band-
width restrictions of QKD, even when operating the data
channels in less-than-ideal conditions. This, however, comes
with the cost of having to reuse the key more than once.
Therefore, this paper discussed sensible boundaries of key
usage to maintain an acceptable level of security (see Section
III). Furthermore, this paper presents an approach to provide
QKD-secured links with high speeds meeting the bounds
discussed in Section III, including a suitable performant and
fault-tolerant key synchronization protocol (the rapid rekeying
protocol) and a corresponding software solution running under
Linux (QKDIPsec), integrated into the AIT QKD software.
Furthermore, this proof of concept was thouroughly tested
both on x86 system architectures and in a simulated machine
environments. These tests showed the operability of the prin-
cipal architecture design as well as possible snares regarding
its implementation. During these tests, it became obvious that
more installed SAs increase the rate of sucessfully deciphered
packets, especially in lower key period settings.
Despite promising test results, there is room for improve-
ment to transform the presented proof of concept module
into a fully productive and integrated part of the AIT QKD
software. Firstly, there are still obstructions to tackle regarding
the integration; the methods for key capturing from the Q3P
Application Buffer have to be elaborated and optimized. Sec-
ondly, further tests are needed to determine the optimal choice
of networking mechanisms. For instance, the implications of
switching from TCP to UDP as a transport layer protocol for
QKDIPsec have to be examined. Thirdly, some procedures
have to be introduced, which automate the reset process in
case of hardware connection losses and resets, eliminating the
need to restart the system manually. Fourthly, to ease its setup,
the solution needs the ability to use virtual interfaces as tunnel
endpoints (currently it only supports virtual addresses). Fiftly,
while the current version of QKDIPsec already supports on-
the-fly adjustments of the key period, the solution should be
able to provide interfaces to automatically align this key period
to a desired rate of data bits per key bit (dpk). This makes it
necessary to provide means to measure the actual data rate
running over the data channel and comparing them to the
key effective key change rate (consisting of key period and
key length). Furthermore, it is desirable to derive a model by
means of ε-security, to achieve a trade-off between the data
rate and the security of this solution.
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